The Scribes Among The Persians
The Persian kings referred to the
letter-writers as “the interpreters (tarājimah) of kings.” They used to
say to them: “Do not let your desire to make speech concise lead you to omit
meanings, abandon proper structure and clarity (al-iblāgh) in
it or weaken the strength of argument.”
It was the established practice in the days
of the Persians that the younger generation (aḥdāth al-kuttāb) of
scribes, and those newly emerging among them, would gather at the palace gates
seeking employment. The king would then command the heads of his chancery to
test them and examine their intellects. Those found worthy would have their
names presented to the king and would be instructed to remain at the gate so
they could be called upon when needed. The king would then assign them to
officials and delegate them to tasks, rotating them through various assignments
in accordance with their abilities and proven merit—until each reached the
position he rightly deserved. No one whose name had been presented to the king
was permitted to act in any official capacity with the people except by the
king’s command and permission. The kings used to elevate the status of scribes,
recognizing the virtue of the craft of writing and honoring (tuḥẓī) its
practitioners—for they combined the excellence of sound judgment with
professional skill. The kings would say:
They are the system by which affairs are
ordered, the perfection of kingship, and the splendor of authority. They are
the speaking tongues of the kings, the treasurers of their wealth, and the
trusted guardians over their subjects and their lands.
When the Persian kings dispatched an army,
they would send along one of their senior scribes (wajhan) and
command the general not to encamp or break camp except with his counsel—seeking
in this the benefit of the scribe’s discernment and prudence. Then the king
would say to the scribe assigned to accompany the expedition:
You know well that the armored soldiers (asāwirah)
are like lions among men. They are not to be reprimanded except for
disobedience, failure to engage, or fleeing from the enemy. Beyond that, they
are not to be blamed. It is upon you that I rely for the governance of this
army.
So the scribe would proceed as the army’s
administrator. If the army leader required correspondence—whether to offer
excuses, issue warnings, report information, or request intelligence—the scribe
would compose it on behalf of the general.
The Taxation System Before Anūshirwān and During His Reign
Before Anūshirwān, the kings of Persia used
to take a share of the people’s harvests and yields. The most they would take
was a third, and the least was a sixth, with varying rates in between based on
irrigation (shirb) and
arable land (rabᶜ). Then Qubādh b. Fīrūz ordered a survey of the
land, a count of palm trees and other trees, and a census of the population [jamājim].
He intended to institute a rates of taxation [waḍāʾiʿ al-kharāj], but he died before completing it.
When Anūshirwān came to power, he completed
the survey and census, and tallied the population. He then convened a public
assembly and commanded his scribes [kuttāb] to calculate the totals,
which they did. He addressed the people, explaining what he had determined:
that the land tax [kharāj] would be levied based on the acreage (jurbān) measured, the number of trees and palms counted, and the total population. He
declared it would be collected in three installments (anjam), each a third of the annual due, spaced every four months. He then consulted the
assembly for their opinion. No one offered any suggestion. He repeated his
words three times, and still the people remained silent. Finally, a man from
among the common folk rose and said: “O King, will you impose a permanent tax [kharāj
bāqī] on a mortal man [insān fānī], on a body that will die, on
crops that wither, on rivers that dry up, and on springs that disappear (taghūru)?”
Then [Kisrā, i.e., Khosrow] said: “O you wretched meddler (dha al-kilfah
al-mashᵓūm), from which class of people are you?” The man replied: “I am
one of the scribes [kuttāb].” So Kisrā said to his scribes: “Beat him
with the inkwells (duwiyy) until he dies.” The scribes struck him, disassociating themselves from his
opinion (tabarriyan), until he died. Then they said: “We are content with what the king has done.” After
that, the tax assessments [waḍāʾiʿ] were categorized according to types
of produce, palm trees, and other trees.
From the Testament of Shābūr to His Son
I found in a royal testament attributed to
Sābūr b. Ardashīr a section in which he addresses his son, saying:
Your vizier [wazīr] should be one whose word
is accepted by you, and whose station is strong in your eyes. His closeness to
you and the refinement of his position in your court should prevent him from
being servile to anyone, or pleading with anyone, or flattering anyone
concerning matters under his authority. Let the confidence he has in you compel
him to offer you sincere counsel and to oppose anyone who seeks to deceive you
or deprive you of your rights. And if he
presents to you an opinion that disagrees with yours or seems to you incorrect,
do not respond with suspicion (jabha al-ẓanīn), nor reject it with a
harsh demeanor that would weaken his resolve and restrain him from presenting
to you (ibthāthika) any
view whose soundness may yet become apparent. Rather, accept what you are
satisfied with of his opinion, and explain to him what harm you feared from the
view you rejected, so that he may benefit from your guidance in his future
considerations. Beware—be most cautious—never to grant this same level of
closeness to anyone else among your attendants or servants, who may hover
around you. Do not make it easy for them to grow familiar in speaking openly
before you or to indulge in discussing the affairs of your subjects and
kingdom, for their opinions cannot be trusted, nor is it safe from their
divulging secrets they may learn from you.
And from that testament is another passage,
in which he says:
Know that the integrity of your rule depends
on the continual collection of the land tax [durūr al-kharāj],
and its collection (durūruhu) depends
on the cultivation and prosperity of the lands [ʿimārat al-bilād].
Attaining the highest degree of this can only be realized through reforming its
people, by applying justice to them and assisting them (maᶜūnah lahum). For indeed, one matter is the cause of another, and the common people [ʿawāmm]
are the support [ʿudda] of the elite [khawāṣṣ], and every class
is in need of the other. Choose for this responsibility the best individuals
you can find among your scribes [kuttāb], those who possess insight [baṣar],
integrity [ʿafāf], and competence [kifāyah]. Assign to each
person a portion [shaqṣ] of work he can carry and complete with ease. If you discover that one of them
has betrayed the trust or overstepped his bounds, then punish him severely and
apply the fullest measure of discipline. Beware of assigning to any land with
high tax yield [kathīr al-kharāj] someone except for the one whose voice
is loud and public [baᶜīd al-ṣawt], whose status is lofty and whose
reputation is noble [ʿaẓīm sharaf al-manzilah]. And do not place over
tax revenue [kharāj] any of your military commanders [quwwād al-jund],
whom you have designated as instruments of war and shields against the
enemy—lest you find some of them committing treachery with the funds and
neglecting their duties. For if you grant him access to wealth and turn a blind
eye to his negligence, it will lead to the loss of funds, harm to the subjects
[raʿiyyah], and invite others toward corruption. But if you rebuke him
and hold him accountable, you will alienate him, diminish his dignity, and
provoke resentment within his heart. This is a matter where caution is
prudence, rushing into it [iqdām] is recklessness, and negligence is
weakness. Also know that if officials become accustomed to acquiring wealth
through sources outside those for which they were appointed and compensated,
their desire for the world [al-dunyā] intensifies, and they will seek
wealth by means other than those for which they were commissioned. Nothing is
more corrupting to officials [ʿummāl] and scribes [kuttāb], or
more ruinous to their integrity and the trust placed in their hands, than the
king’s ignorance of their conditions, his lack of awareness of their behavior,
and his failure to reward the righteous for their good deeds or punish the
wrongdoers for their misdeeds. Therefore, investigate thoroughly the conduct of
the tax officials [ʿummāl al-kharāj], their management, and their
legacies. Select for this task spies [ʿuyūn] in whom you have full
confidence. Know that among the tax collectors are those who may had over (yulajji) portions
of their land or estates to the king’s inner circle [khāṣṣah] or
household [biṭānah] for one of two reasons—both of which you should
detest (hariyy bi karahati himā): either to escape the tyranny of administrators (jawr al-ᶜummāl) and
oppressive governors, which signals the failure of your officials and your own
weakness as king and your inability to observe what is under your rule, or to
evade their rightful dues and avoid liabilities (al-kasr). This latter practice undermines the discipline of your subjects and
destabilizes your sovereignty (al-mulk). So beware of it, and punish both those who offer such protection and those who
seek it.
A Passage From A Letter By [Ardashīr], Addressing His Viziers
Know that if your intention is never to rely
on anyone unless he possesses all praiseworthy qualities and embodies every
commendable trait, then you are desiring something exceedingly rare—indeed,
something that may not be found at all. So suffice yourselves, in matters of a
person’s religion and piety [dīn wa waraʿ], with his avoidance of
major sins and grievous offenses, and his aversion to persistent injustice and
wrongdoing. And as for trustworthiness [amānah] and chastity [ʿafāf],
let it be enough that he refrains from temptations when they present
themselves, especially in situations that openly bear signs of deficiency or
harm. And as for his competence and
effectiveness [ghināʾ a nafādh], let it be that he is capable of the tasks for which you employ him and that he
does not neglect any of your affairs entrusted to him. Know also that some
duties are such that others beneath you can fulfill them, and others are of a
kind that none but you can carry out. Know well the boundaries between these.
Do not burden yourselves with what your subordinates can sufficiently handle, nor
burden others with what rightly falls within your own responsibility. If you
find yourselves with free time after fulfilling your obligations, then seek
relief (bi al-tawaddaᶜ) and
renewal through rest and tranquility, to better equip yourselves for future
labor.
Kushtāsab’s Advice to his Scribes
Kushtāsab used to say to the scribes [kuttāb]:
Adhere to chastity [ʿafāf], and
uphold trust [amānah] in all that is entrusted to you. Combine your
inherent dispositions and intellects with the study of refined conduct [adab].
Practice what you gain from adab according to the natural inclinations
of your minds. Let your judgments be guided by fairness [qisṭ] and
equity [muʿādalah]. And do not present to us anything discussion [aḥdūthah]
which would not suit us, or which does not merit being favored.
Abrawīz’s Address to His Viziers
When Abarwīz b. Hurmuz assumed power, he
gathered his subjects and delivered a sermon to them (khaṭaba ̣ᶜalayhim), in a part of which he [specifically] addressed his vizier:
Conceal secrets, speak truthfully, exert
yourself in sincere counsel, and be vigilant through caution. It is upon me not
to act hastily with you until I have considered carefully, nor to turn toward
you until I have certainty, nor to place hopes in you only to be betrayed.
Example of Anūshirwān’s Justice
It is reported that injustice [jawr]
increased during the reign of Anūshirwān, and the Mūbadhān Mūbadh said to him:
O King, I have heard our jurists say:
'Whenever justice does not overwhelm injustice in a land, its people will be
afflicted with an enemy that invades them, and they will fear a succession of
calamities upon them.' We now fear this very thing, as a certain extent of
injustice has spread among your officials (asbābika).
Anūsharwān reflected upon the matter and
concluded that indeed injustice and wrongdoing had occurred. As a result, he
had eighty individuals crucified—fifty from among the scribes [kuttāb],
and thirty from among the administrators and treasurers [ʿummāl wa umanāʾ].
Sasanian Kings and the Taxpayers
After the time of Anūshirwān, the Akāsirah
(Sasanian kings) would say to the taxpayers [ahl al-kharāj]:
Whoever among you dislikes paying the tax to
the officials [ʿummāl], here is our treasury [bayt māl];
pay it directly. Because of this, no official dared commit an injustice against
anyone, fearing that the people might instead deliver the tax directly to the
treasury—thus exposing the official’s misconduct.
The Status of the Scribes
And in the days of the Persians, no one
rode in the himālīj (luxurious covered carriages) except the king, the scribe [kātib], and
the judge [qāḍī].
Aristotle and Alexander
Aristotle (Arisṭāṭālīs) had been the tutor
of Alexander. When Alexander grew up and rose to prominence, recognizing from
Aristotle the depth of wisdom known to those who understood it, he came to
treat him like a vizier [wazīr], relying on him for counsel and strategy. Alexander
once wrote to Aristotle informing him that among his courtiers and soldiers such
men became numerous who he did not trust of their high ambitions, courage unusual
and exceptional state (shudhūdh ālatihim). In his view, their
minds were not equal to these noble traits [that is, their intellects did not
match the scale of their lofty aspirations].
Aristotle wrote back to him:
I understood what you mentioned regarding
the men you described. As for their high ambitions—loyalty is part of high ambition.
And as for what you said about their bravery despite their lack of intellect:
whosoever is in this state, then grant him a life of comfort and privilege him
with beautiful women. For luxurious living weakens resolve, and love of women
inclines one toward peace and distances him from engaging in risk. Let your
character be noble, for through good character one draws out the sincerity of
intentions and the honesty of speech. Do not indulge in pleasures that are out
of reach for the average of your companions—for where there is inequality,
there is no love, and where there is mutual sharing, there is no hatred.
Abarwīz’s Advice to his Son Shīrūyah
Abarwīz advised his son Shīrūyah with a
lengthy testament. In one of its sections, he said:
Let the one you choose as your vizier be a
man who had once been low in rank and whom you raised, or a man of noble birth
who had been wronged and whom you brought close. Do not appoint a man whom you
had punished, for he has been humiliated by it. Nor a man who obeyed you only
after you debased him. Nor anyone who harbors in his heart the thought that
your downfall would benefit him more than your survival. Beware of appointing
someone who is naive and inexperienced [ḍaraʿan ghumran], or an aged elder whose judgment has waned just as his body has declined with
age.
The Persians’ Advice
The Persians used to say:
The vizier has three privileges with the
king, and the scribe [kātib] has three with his master: 1. Unbarred
access (no need for permission to enter), 2. Disregarding the accusations of
slanderers, 3. And being entrusted with secrets.
Advice of the Indians
In one of the books of the Indians it is
written:
If the vizier becomes equal to the king in
wealth, prestige, and the obedience he commands from the people, then let the
king strike him down. And if he does not, let him know that he himself is the
one who will be struck down (maṣrūᶜ).
Among the most remarkable examples of
intense caution is what was recounted in another Indian text:
That a gift was presented to one of their
kings consisting of jewelry [ḥulī] and fine garments [kiswah],
and present with him were two of his wives and one of his viziers. He offered
one of his wives the choice between the clothing and the jewelry. The woman
glanced toward the vizier, as if seeking his counsel. The vizier discreetly
signaled with one of his eyes for her to choose the clothing. But the king
noticed the gesture. So the woman, in order to deflect the king’s suspicion,
chose the jewelry instead of the clothing—as if she had not seen the signal. After
that incident, the vizier spent forty years keeping one eye squinted or
lowered, so the king would believe that the gesture had only been a natural
habit or a congenital trait.
Sābūr and Counsel of Two of His Viziers to Him
Sābūr Dhū al-Aktāf consulted two of his
viziers on a matter of governance. One of them said to him:
It is not proper for the king to consult any
one of us except in private. That is better for safeguarding the secret, more
prudent in judgment, more conducive to safety, and spares us from the potential
harm of one another. For a single individual is solely accountable for what has
been shared with him, and he is more likely to keep it hidden—out of fear of
the king and desire for his favor. But if the matter is shared with two, and it
becomes known, suspicion will fall upon the king, and both men will be subject
to evasion and pretexts. If he punishes them, he punishes two for a single
offense. If he accuses them, he accuses the innocent alongside the guilty. And
if he pardons them both, he pardons one who has done no wrong—and another upon
whom the proof stands.
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